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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Appellant's Addendum of Exhibits was filed for the convenience of the 
Court in locating Bingham's citations to the record. On page 17 of his brief Rasekh 
argues that Bingham has not made proper citations to the record to support her 
Facts. Bingham noted in her Brief's "Preliminary Statement" that she had 
duplicated the fact statement as set out in her "Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant Kal Rasekh's Motion for Summary Judgment" as filed below ( R at 1004-
1026). In that Memorandum Bingham's Fact Statements cited to exhibits contained 
in an Addendum of Exhibits as filed below (See Exhibit "A" Attached) to which 
Appellant's Appeal Addendum is a duplication. That is true with the exception of 
the Memorandum for Summary Judgment ( R at 921 - 945 and 1004 - 1026) as well 
as certain affidavits filed below ( R at 984 - 991, 1041 -1045, 1046-1049, 1050-
1062) which were included at the end of the Bingham Appeal Addendum. 
Bingham intended to point out to the Appellate Court the District Court 
Clerk's Certificate of the Record Pages which applied to the Addendum. Upon 
conducting an investigation it was learned that the Plaintiff's Addendum as filed 
below was missing from the District Court's record as were pertinent parts of the 
Addendum of Rasekh ( R at 658-920) filed below. Appellant has filed a Motion to 
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have the district court record supplemented to incorporate the lost Addendum of 
Exhibits. 
Thus all references in the Fact Statements of the Appel lant to the Addendum 
f i led on Appeal w i l l have been certified when the district court clerk certifies the 
Addendum as f i led below wh ich should preclude any question as to whether the 
exhibits as cited by Appellee were before the lower cour t . 1 
ADDENDUM INDEX 
Items 1 through 21 are identically found in Record ("R") at 1255 through 1400. 
Item Identification Page(s) 
1 Michael Drury Deposition - December 14, 1999 - Select pages. 1-12 
Rat 1255-1267 ; 
2 Marie Bingham Deposition - October 25-26, 1999 - Select Pages from 13-38 
Volumes I. R at 1268-1293; See also 452 - 550; 670 - 768; See also 
1 3 - 3 4 , 
3 Marie Bingham Deposition - November 22, 1999 - Select pages from 39-50 
Volume II - R at 1294-1305; See Also 640-645 and 38(a) - 50. 
4 Kal Rasekh Deposition - December 16, 1999 - Select pages. 51-58 
R at 1306-1313; See also 51-61 and 785 - 789. 
5 Harvey Hirschi Deposition - December 14, 1999 - Select pages. 59-61 
R at 1314-1316; 
1 ln a discussion with the district court appellate clerk it was learned that these 
exhibits had possibly been removed by the judges clerks and not returned to the file. The 
district court appeals clerk indicated that the Addendum of Exhibits when found or 
supplemented and incorporated into the clerk's Certification of the Record would take on 
page numbers following those of the present Clerk's Certificate. Thus, the Addendum of 
Exhibits as filed below wil l most likely comprise page numbers 1255 through 1400 of the 
paginated record. 
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6 VR Utah Offer for Purchase and Sale of Assets Agreement and 62-63 
Addendum dated 3-2-1995. Rat 1317-1318 
7 April 20, 1995 Letter from Consolidated Realty to Marie Bingham. 64-65 
Rat 1319-1320 
8 May 24, 1995 Letter from Marie Bingham to Michael Drury/VRUtah. 66 
Rat 1321 
9 May 24, 1995 Release Agreement provided to VR Utah by Marie 67-68 
Bingham and signed by Bingham. R at 1322-1323 
10 May 24, 1995 Letter from W. David Weston to Randall Roberts re: 69 
copies of lease agreement. Rat 1324 
11 June 3, 1995 Letter from W. David Weston to Randall Roberts re: 70 
copies of commercial lease agreement. R at 1325 
12 Commercial Property Lease dated June 1, 1995 between Randall 71 -92 
Roberts and Marie Bingham - along with Option to Purchase. 
Rat 1326-1347 
13 Release Agreement dated June 22, 1995 signed by VR Utah. R at 93 
1348 
14 Notice of Default dated July 10, 1995 from Hirschi to Marie Bingham. 94 
Rat 1349 
15 August 16, 1995 Notice of Default from Marie Bingham to Randall 96 
Roberts re: Lease. R at 1351 
16 1-26-1995 Memo Record of Showing re: Gordon Olsen. Rat 1353 98 
17 May 8, 1995 Letter from Marie Bingham to Randall Roberts re: W. 99 
David Weston to act as agent. R at 1354 
18 On or about September 18, 1995 - Letter from Marie Bingham to Kal 100 
Rasekh. Rat 1355 
19 Plaintiff's Verified Answers to Defendant Michael Drury and VR Utah, 103-122 
Inc. First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff. R at 1358-1377 
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20 January 11, 1995 Letter from VRUtah to Steve Tate re: Hirschi Center. 123 
Rat 1378 
21 Randall Roberts - Steak Restaurant - Prospectus - dated June 15, 1995. 124-145 
Rat 1379-1400 
22 Defendant Kal Rasekh's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 146-170 
Summary Judgment. Rat 921-945 
23 Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Kal Rasekh's 171 -192 
Motion for Summary Judgment. R at 1004 -1025 
24 Affidavit of Marie Bingham in Opposition to Defendants Michael 193-205 
Drury, VR Utah and Kal Rasekh's Motions for Summary Judgment. 
Rat 1050-1062 
25 Affidavit of Jennifer Weston Smith in Opposition to Defendant Kal 206-209 
Rasekh's Motion for Summary Judgment. R at 1046 -1209 
26 Affidavit of David Weston in Opposition to Defendants Michael 210-214 
Drury, VR Utah and Kal Rasekh's Motions for Summary Judgment. 
Rat 1041 -1045 
27 Affidavit of Marie Bingham in Opposition to Defendants Harvey C. 215-222 
and Lois R. Hirschi's Motion for Summary Judgment. R at 984 - 991 
FACTS REBUTTAL STATEMENT 
RASEKH HAS NOT REFUTED THE FACTS ESTABLISHING 
A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP 
I. Uncontroverted Facts: (^ ^ 's are to Mrs. Bingham's Fact Statements in the Opening 
Brief). 
Rasekh's facts and arguments would limit the Court's focus to Rasekh as a 
limited agent by virtue of his real estate license and the sale documents. Rasekh 
presents no contrary facts to rebut Mrs. Bingham's Facts (% *H 's 3 - 6) that the 
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confidential relationship Rasekh established with Mrs. Bingham far surpassed that of a 
real estate agent seeking to show a property, make a sale and collect a commission. 
Rasekh does not dispute the Facts (H <fl 's 3-6) which establish that, independent of his 
role as a real estate agent and leading up to the listing agreement, he ingratiated 
himself with Marie Bingham and her family so as to develop a trusting confidential 
relationship (See App I pg. 58). 
Nor is any evidence presented to counter the fact that within the framework of 
the confidential relationship Rasekh developed, he obtained confidential personal 
financial information about Mrs. Bingham's finances (*H 1-3, 6, 12, 28 - 29) which he 
later exploited. Rasekh's Facts do not counter the evidence that Rasekh, as a result of 
his confidential relationship, learned that Mrs. Bingham was receiving a inheritance 
from the sale of her father's home and that she would be willing to sell her own home 
where she lived for 30 years because of her financial distress arising from the support 
of her (nine) children following a divorce (<H Tl's 2, 28 - 29 Also App. pg. 14a, 195 ). 
Rasekh also learned that her sole outside income was her part time work as a sales 
clerk in a clothing store and that she could be duped because of her lack of 
sophistication (HH1-2). 
Rasekh does not refute the facts that his acts over a two year period consisted of, 
among others, popping into the Bingham home unannounced for dinner, frequent 
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visits during the week in casual clothing following a soccer practice (App 194), 
proposing to marry one of Marie Bingham's daughters and taking one of her daughters 
to Egypt to attend his sister's wedding (App pgs. 194, 58 "like a son to the Bingham 
family"). Once having gained her confidence he proposed to secure her (then 
uncertain) future by placing her in a home associated with a business which would 
provide her a substantial income without risk (^ H 14, 17, 21 - 22, 26 - 27). The 
independence and security that only a person in Mrs. Bingham's situation would hope 
for in her dreams. 
The uncontroverted evidence is that Mrs. Bingham had no ability to evaluate the 
risk's associated with Rasekh's investment advice. Notwithstanding her several visits 
to the Hirschi Center there is simply no evidence that she had any business acumen 
(*H ^ 's 1-2, 8, 14, 19, 27) with which to evaluate her experience. Just the opposite, she 
had no experience and naively relied on Rasekh's affirmations that there was no risk, 
that his advice was the best for her and in the event of the unforseen he would take 
care of her through his assurances of repurchase (*H <U 's 27, 22, 17). The unrefuted 
evidence is that Mrs. Bingham lacked the capital to have survived for one week in the 
business Rasekh induced her to purchase so as to obtain a commission (*H ^ 's 30-32). 
When the weight of that reality descended upon her shoulders and Rasekh was no 
longer anywhere to be found her trust faded (*U % 's 31-33). The fact most noteworthy 
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is that after an intimate two year prior relationship that saw Mr. Rasekh in the Bingham 
home weekly, once He obtained the commission from the Hirschi business and her 
home the visits instantly terminated and Rasekh vanished out of the Bingham's lives. 
REPLY ARGUMENTS 
I. 
THE EXISTENCE OF A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP IS ESTABLISHED FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURPOSES 
Rasekh did not contest the existence of a confidential relationship in making his 
motion for summary judgment and does not do so in his brief, remarking only as 
follows: 
Whether or not Bingham had a confidential relationship with Rasekh 
outside her purchase of the Hirschi Center, it is undisputed that Bingham 
conducted her own independent investigations regarding her purchase of 
the Hirschi Center rebutting any inference of a confidential relationship in 
connection with that purchase. (Rasekh's brief, pg. 17). 
After reading again the trial court's findings and based upon the argument made in 
Rasekh's brief Mrs. Bingham now believes that the court did not rule that the lack of a 
confidential relationship was established as a matter of law, but rather framed 
summary judgment on the existence of a lack of breach of duties. In any event there is 
sufficient evidence of a confidential relationship to send that issue to a jury. Rather 
than arguing that there is no confidential relationship Rasekh makes the erroneous 
7 
statement that if Mrs. Bingham made an investigation in this case that such 
investigation rebuts any inference of a confidential relationship in connection with this 
purchase. 
I I . 
A JURY QUESTION EXISTS CONCERNING BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES. 
The argument that an investigation rebuts any inference of a confidential 
relationship misconstrues the law. For purposes of this appeal since it is not claimed 
that a confidential relationship does not exist as a matter of law, the existence of such 
relationship is established for summary judgment purposes. The proper focus in 
connection with this purchase is whether there is a question of fact concerning 
violation of fiduciary duties. 
Where a confidential relationship exists, a presumption of unfairness arises 
which must be overcome by countervailing evidence, and the burden shifts to the 
defendant to prove absence of unfairness by a preponderance of the evidence. 5ee 
Robertson v. Campbell, Utah, 674 P..2d 1226 (1983). As stated in Robertson v. 
Campbell, id. the doctrine of confidential relations requires that if a confidential 
relationship is found to exist between two parties to a transaction, and if the superior 
party (in whom trust has been reposed) benefits from the transaction, then "equity 
raises a presumption of undue influence and casts upon that party the burden to show 
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affirmatively entire fairness on his part and freedom of the other from undue influence." 
See also Reubsamen v. Maddocks, Me., 340 A.2d 31 , 36 (1975), quoting Eldridge v. 
May, 129 Me. 112, 116, 150 A. 378, 379 (1930) (ellipsis in original omitted). 
It is not up to the party in the inferior position of the confidential relationship to 
prove that she acted under the influence of the dominant party, but rather the 
dominant party must affirmatively show entire fairness on his part and freedom of the 
other from undue influence. One of the duties imposed by a confidential relationship 
is that the fiduciary must act in an entirely fair manner and must not exert undue 
influence on the other. 
Is it not evidence of undue influence for Rasekh to tell Mrs. Bingham to not trust 
the advice of her brother or daughters because they were not as successful as him? 
Even though Rasekh told Mrs. Bingham to disregard the advise of her brother and 
daughters he is urging this court to preclude her from seeking relief because she 
obtained and then disregarded such advise. Choosing instead to trust Rasekh based 
upon his claims that he knew better than her family that this was a good investment 
and in fact one without risk, because he stood ready to buy her out if necessary. One 
of the very elements of a confidential relationship is the dominance of one party and 
the weakness of the other. It should seem obvious that Mrs. Bingham's willingness to 
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disregard the advise of others after being told to do so by Rasekh is strong evidence of 
her weakness, which subjects her to the power of Rasekh, rather than a reason to 
preclude the application of the confidential relationship. Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 
1024, 1027 (Utah 1987). Rasekh faults Mrs. Bingham for the very weakness that is a 
necessary element of the relationship. The fact that Mrs. Bingham sought advise from 
family and friends and then disregarded it when told to do so by Rasekh could be 
construed by a jury as evidence of undue influence. Every reasonable inference should 
be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment 
Katzenberger v. State, 735 P.2d 405, 408 (Utah App. 1987). In addition the breach of 
a promise made during a confidential relationship wil l be construed as constructively 
fraudulent because of the special reliance present. Estate of Davis, 954 S.W. 2d 374. 
A promise made and broken by the one in the superior position is not only a breach of 
promise, but also a breach of fiduciary duty, and can be pursued as a breach of 
fiduciary duty and constructive fraud. The two strongest indications of the breach of 
fiduciary duties is the promise that there was no risk to Mrs. Bingham and to disregard 
information to the contrary because Rasekh knew best because of his experience and 
personal success. 
The determination whether or not there is a breach of fiduciary duties is highly 
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fact dependent. C & Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, 896 P.2d 47 (Utah 1995), and 
therefore not normally susceptible to summary judgment. All of the facts need to be 
explored by the jury to determine whether or not Rasekh violated his fiduciary duties 
by his actions in this case. 
III. 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY 
Rasekh claims that all of the cases cited by Mrs. Bingham for the proposition that 
a fiduciary relationship takes oral promises out of the statute of limitations fall within 
two narrow exceptions, not applicable to the facts of this case; namely 
misrepresentations regarding credit and the imposition of a constructive trust. It is not 
true that all of the decided cases fall within these two narrow exceptions, in fact just 
the opposite is true. The case of Teeling v. The Indiana Nat. Bank, 436 N.E. 2d 855, 
859 (Indiana 1982), states the following: 
Finally, we find the question of whether the existence of a fiduciary duty 
falls outside the operation of the Statute of Frauds, IC 32-2-1-6, is one of 
first impression in Indiana. However, it has been held the statute was not 
intended to cover oral representations made in violation of a fiduciary 
relationship. 
See also W.G. Jenkins & Co. v. Standrod, (1928) 46 Idaho 614, 269 P. 586; see 
72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds § 176 at 707 (1974) and Brock & Davis Co., Inc. v. 
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Charleston National Bank, (S.D. W.Va. 1977) 443 F.Supp. 1175. As explained by the 
Idaho Supreme Court in W.G. Jenkins & Co. v. Standrod, supra at 620-621, 269 P. at 
588: 
"[i]n Pasley v. Freeman, (1789) 3 Term Rep. 51 , 1 R.R. 634, 100 Eng. 
Reprint 450, it was held that a false affirmation as to the credit of a third 
person, made by the defendant with intent to defraud the plaintiff, and in 
reliance upon which the plaintiff extended credit to the third person, was 
actionable though it did not appear that the defendant benefitted by the 
deceit or that he colluded with the person benefitted, but merely 
knowingly asserted the falsehood. It is generally considered that it was to 
remedy the evils and abuses growing up under this decision that Lord 
Tenterden's Act was passed by Parliament in 1828. Knight v. Rawlings, 
[(1907) 205 Mo. 412, 104 S.W. 38]. Our statute (C.S. § 7978), though 
abbreviated in form, is founded upon Lord Tenterden's Act. No case has 
been cited, and we find none, applying such statute to a situation where 
the representors were acting in a fiduciary capacity. The Dissenting 
opinion of Grose, J., in Pasley v. Freeman, supra, urges against the 
adoption of the rule there laid down, among other reasons, the fact that 
the defendant was in no situation in which the law considered him in any 
trust or demanded from him any account of the credit of the third person; 
and in Knight v. Rawlings, supra, in applying the Missouri statute as 
prohibiting evidence of oral representations involved in that case, it is 
pointed out that the defendant there did not sustain a confidential relation 
to plaintiff. We think the statute was not intended to cover oral 
representations made in violation of a fiduciary relationship. The 
gravamen of the charge here is a breach of those relations, and if, as an 
incident to proving that charge, it becomes necessary to prove oral 
representations, we think the statute does not preclude such proof, in 
view of its history and purpose. Like the statute in Jenkins, IC 32-2-1-6 is 
a modern enactment of Lord Tenterden's Act. Cook v. Churchman, (1885) 
104 Ind. 141, 3 N.E. 759. We conclude, therefore, the existence of a 
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fiduciary relationship removes a case from the operation of \C 32-2-1-6. 
The court in Teeling, supra, pointed out that this was a case of first impression in 
Indiana. This is the case in Utah as well. The courts in Utah have declared that the 
statute of frauds should not be imposed in such a way as to aid in the commission of a 
fraud. Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 347 (Utah 1998). The court should declare 
as did the supreme court of Idaho and other courts that the statute of frauds should not 
be used to aid the commission of constructive fraud by following the lead of other 
states and holding that the statute of frauds does not apply to representations made in a 
fiduciary capacity. 
Mrs. Bingham would hope that it would be the policy of the state of Utah that a 
real estate agent, acting in a confidential relationship as an investment advisor, could 
not induce a buyer to make an investment by promises that there was no risk because 
the agent/advisor would buy the property from the purchaser if the investment did not 
work out and then hide behind the statute of frauds. Real estate agents are certainly 
entitled to make commissions from sales, but they should not be allowed to make 
commissions from sales wherein they give investment advise through the establishment 
of a confidential relationship and by making promises that they do not keep and then 
attempt to shield themselves from liability by invoking the statute of frauds to cover 
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what otherwise would be constructive fraud on their part. 
When viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Mrs. Bingham there 
certainly is the appearance that Rasekh is a con man. Creating a trusting relationship 
with Mrs. Bingham, inducing her to put all of the money in the world she has into a 
business, telling her to trust him and not others, promising there is no risk, and then 
dropping her like a hot potato, both professionally and socially, when he gets his 
commission. 
IV. 
RASEKH COULD HAVE FULFILLED HIS FIDUCIARY DUTIES. 
Rasekh admits that before the Hirschi Center was foreclosed that Rasekh took a 
listing from Mrs. Bingham for the Center (See Rasekh's Brief page 14 ^21). During the 
time he had this listing Rasekh could have fulfilled his fiduciary duty and purchased 
the Hirschi Center from Mrs. Bingham, before it was foreclosed. In addition Rasekh's 
fiduciary responsibility required that he monitor the situation after the sale. It was 
Rasekh's sudden disappearance after the sale that developed her mistrust and forced 
the Mrs. Bingham into the position of having to list with someone else. If Rasekh had 
maintained the same relationship and level of contact with Mrs. Bingham after the sale 
as he did before he certainly could have found a way to fulfill his fiduciary duties. 
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V. 
THERE IS EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS 
In Galloway v. AFCO Development Corp., 777 P.2d 506 (Utah 1989), the court 
stated that a professional real estate agent is in a far better position than the buyer to 
ascertain whether the security for the buyer's investment was indeed adequate, and 
since a commission was received the real estate agent was thus under a duty to 
ascertain the truth of his representations concerning the adequacy of the security he 
represented the investors would receive. In failing so to do, he was negligent, and, 
therefore, liable for negligent misrepresentation. Rasekh's position that he had no duty 
to investigate the claims he made about the financial condition of the Hirschi Center 
run afoul of the holding of Galloway, id. 
Since Rasekh told Mrs. Bingham to ignore the advise of her brother which was 
contrary to his he should not be able to claim there are uncontradicted facts that would 
establish that her reliance on his statements was not reasonable. To determine 
whether reliance is reasonable all facts connected with the case must be examined, 
and this determination is usually a question for the jury. Berkeley Bank for Coops, v. 
Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah 1980). The rational found In Berkeley Bank for 
Coops., id., concerning reasonable reliance should also apply. In that case the court 
15 
held it could be reasonable to rely on oral statements made by the bank about a note 
even though the note contained written provisions to the contrary. A jury should 
decide if Mrs. Bingham's reliance on Rasekh's promises and assurances were 
reasonable based upon his position of superiority, the bond of trust and statements to 
trust and rely on Rasekh because of his experience and financial success and ignore 
advise contrary to his. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Summary Judgment was not appropriate and should be reversed where the 
evidence is persuasive that a confidential relationship existed between Rasekh and 
Mrs. Bingham and that there were breaches of fiduciary duty and negligent 
misrepresentations. It is also a jury question whether Mrs. Bingham's reliance was 
reasonable. 
Respectfully submitted this 21 st day of October, 2002. 
^ 
Ronald George, attorney for Mrs. Bingham 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, hereby certifies that on the 21 st day of October, 2002, that 
two copies of the Mrs. Bingham's Reply Brief on Appeal were mailed postage prepaid 
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Paul Veasy 
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